University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality
Elizabeth A. Rowe
University of Florida Levin College of Law, rowe@law.ufl.edu

Daniel M. Mahfood

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Rowe & Daniel M. Mahfood, Trade Secrets, Trade, and Extraterritoriality, 66 Ala. L. Rev. 63
(2014), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/735/

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

TRADE SECRETS, TRADE, AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY

Elizabeth A. Rowe
Daniel M Mahfoodc
I. INTRODUCTION

A.
B.

................................................

The Litigation Challenge ..........................
A Trade-BasedApproach
..................

II. THE BACKDROP OF ESPIONAGE

............
III. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROBLEM ...........................

A.

B.

C.

64

65
........ 66
...................... 67
69

Existing Landscape in Trade Secrecy........
......... 70
1. BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corp.....70
2. Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Huawei Technologies, Co., Ltd.......72
Extraterritorialityin OtherAreas ofIntellectual Property....... 73
1. Trademark Law..............................73
2. Patent Law.................................78
InternationalTreaties ............................
81

IV. TIANRUI AND THE ITC...................................82

A.

B.

Backgroundon the InternationalTrade Commission ........... 83
1. Section 337 and IntellectualProperty
.
............... 85
2. Proceduresfor Investigations Under Section 337...........87
3. Advantages of Section 337 Proceedings......
....... 88
The TianRui Dispute
..............................
90
1. The Federal Circuit on TianRui
.........
.......... 91
2. The Dissent
................................. 93

V. SECTION 337: A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

.......................

94

Border Control
......................................
95
Similar to Patent Law's Approach
.................... 97
Better Toolfor Trade Secret Owners .............
..... 97
Questions Remain.
..........................
..... 99
ExploringAlternative Approaches
..........................101
1. The Economic EspionageAct ............
........ 1 02
2. PossibleLegislative Alternative............
...... 102

VI. CONCLUSION

....................................................

63

104

64

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:1:63

I. INTRODUCTION

Foreign espionage against United States companies' trade secrets is
reportedly a large and growing problem that both the federal government
and private businesses have long struggled to effectively confront.' A
primary obstacle to doing so is the principle of territoriality-the notion
that U.S. law applies only to acts that take place on U.S. soil.2 As a
consequence of this principle, American companies doing business abroad,
or whose trade secrets are misappropriated abroad, have limited recourse
against a potential infringer through either criminal or civil actions. The
conflict presented between the territorial nature of our laws and the global
nature of the way we do business is not one for which a one-size-fits-all
solution exists.
In general, U.S. law provides two paths to address the misappropriation
of a trade secret: criminal and civil. Criminal claims can be filed pursuant
to the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), but because U.S. Attorneys have
sole discretion to file such actions, criminal claims are a limited option for
private companies. 3 Civil actions are therefore the most common and
realistic option for aggrieved trade secret owners.4 However, no framework
exists for the extraterritorial application of U.S. trade secret law in the civil
context.5 Moreover, the fact that no federal civil law (but only state law)
governs trade secrecy in the United States presents a further and still
unaddressed challenge to dealing with extraterritoriality in this area.6

UFRF Professor of Law, Feldman Gale Term Professor in Intellectual Property and Director,
*
Program in Intellectual Property Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I appreciate
comments received on earlier drafts of this paper from participants at the Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference held at Stanford Law School. Thank you also to Jessica Dafonte and Michal-Ane McIntosh
for excellent research assistance, and to the University of Florida Levin College of Law for its research

support.
**
Clerk to the Honorable Susan H. Black, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law.
1.
See, e.g., Robin L. Kuntz, How Not to Catch a Thief Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails
to ProtectAmerican Trade Secrets, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 901, 903 (2013) ("[T]he legislative history
behind the [Economic Espionage Act of 1996] reveals that Congress was especially worried about

foreign threats to American economic prosperity.").
2.
See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Territorialityand TangibilityAfter Transocean, 61 EMORY L.J. 1087, 1100 (2012).
3.
See Kuntz, supra note 1, at 908-09; see also Gerald O'Hara, Cyber-Espionage:A Growing
Threat to the American Economy, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 241, 251 (2010) ("Despite its aspirations
to impose harsh criminal penalties, the EEA fails to provide a robust enforcement mechanism against
foreign cybercriminals who initiate attacks on American corporations.").

4.

The civil cases will therefore be the focus of this Article.

5.

See Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA.

J. INT'L L. 505, 507 (1997) ("[T]he general rules governing the extraterritorial application of federal
statutes are in a state of uncertainty.").
6.
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-SecretLaw ShieldDisclosures

to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 798 (2010).
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The Litigation Challenge

The extraterritoriality problem applies to our intellectual property laws
generally and is not unique to trade secret law.7 To the extent trademark,
patent, and trade secret law limit the ability of intellectual property owners
in the United States to enforce their rights in this country, or allow for some
degree of enforcement but subject that enforcement to unpredictable
frameworks, the law places a substantial burden on commerce. The
substantive law, procedural rules, and practical reality converge to present
significant hurdles to litigation.
For a variety of reasons, domestic intellectual property holders strongly
prefer litigation in the United States. If, for instance, reports are true that
the Chinese government has condoned or directed the espionage originating
in that country, U.S. trade secret holders would be understandably leery of
litigating in a Chinese forum.9 In addition, U.S. intellectual property law is
generally more developed than that in other countries, particularly in the
countries that are the primary source of foreign misappropriation.10
Moreover, plaintiffs generally see U.S. courts as an attractive venue in civil
litigation due to, inter alia, broad discovery rules, the potential for high
damage awards, acceptance of contingent fee agreements, and a general
rule that litigants are not required to pay opposing party attorney's fees."
An administration focused on combating international trade secret
misappropriation (commonly referred to as corporate or economic
espionage) should be supportive of American businesses' preference to
enforce their trade secrets in U.S. forums. The U.S. government has
increased its efforts to exert political pressure on jurisdictions where
misappropriation is rampant,1 2 but these efforts are hardly new.1 3 While the

7.
8.

See, e.g., Holbrook, supranote 2.
See generally, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the IntellectualProperty Bar: The Hague

Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 421, 422-25 (2001); see also Brendan J. Witherell, Note,
Trademark Law-The ExtraterritorialApplication of the Lanham Act: The First Circuit Cuts the Fat

from the Vanity Fair Test, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193, 204 (2006) ("Typically, plaintiffs prefer to
litigate in the United States where trademark laws are more protective than the laws of other countries.
In addition, U.S. courts are more appealing because of favorable procedural rules and standards.").
9.
See Victoria Espinel, Launch of the Administration'sStrategy to Mitigate the Theft of U.S.
Trade Secrets, OFFICE OF
MGMT. & BUDGET BLOG (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:59 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/02/20/launch-administration-s-strategy-mitigate-theft-us-tradesecrets.
10.
See Bradley, supra note 5, at 506-07 ("U.S. intellectual property laws are often more
protective than those of other countries .... ); see also Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, "The Google
Challenge": Enforcement of Noncompete and Trade Secret Agreements for Employees Working in
China, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 603 (2007) (discussing the evolution of Chinese trade secret law).
11.
See Bradley, supra note 5, at 506-47 (citing GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURT 3-5 (3d ed. 1996)).
12.
See Espinel, supra note 9.

13.

See e.g., Bradley supranote 5, at 510-12 (describing efforts dating to the mid-1990s).
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FBI and Department of Justice continue to assert that prosecution of trade
secret misappropriation claims is a "top priority,"l 4 trade secret owners
themselves are likely to be the most vigilant and conscientious in asserting
and prosecuting trade secret claims if they are given an appropriate forum
in which to do so.
For all of these reasons, providing a domestic forum to prosecute
extraterritorial infringement would substantially benefit domestic trade
secret holders. However, the current cases demonstrate the wide divergence
in the manner courts apply U.S. trade secret laws to redress extraterritorial
misappropriation. In the absence of a coherent framework, courts have
struggled to find consistency, which, in turn, has left trade secret owners
unsure of the extent of their enforceable rights.
B. A Trade-BasedApproach
This Article is the first to suggest that while we await a comprehensive
solution to this thorny issue, a focus on trade is a useful approach for
dealing with the territoriality quagmire. Accordingly, the Article explores
an illustrative case study of a trade-based approach to this problem. It
examines a decision from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that
appears to create a novel avenue for a U.S. court to reach extraterritorial
conduct." Specifically, in TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade
Commission,1 6 the Federal Circuit reviewed the International Trade
Commission's (ITC) use of section 337 of the Tariff Act of 193017 to cover
extraterritorial misappropriation of trade secrets. Section 337 limits the
remedy for extraterritorial misappropriation to a prohibition on importation
into the United States. Given this limited remedy, the Federal Circuit held
that the ITC could appropriately address what was otherwise purely
extraterritorial conduct.18
In ruling as it did, the Federal Circuit highlighted what had been a
largely unnoticed but potentially useful tool19 by which businesses can
address extraterritorial theft of their trade secrets. 20 Outside of this
approach, businesses looking to enforce their trade secret rights
internationally face the prospect of costly litigation in far-flung and

14.

See Espinel, supra note 9.

15.
16.
17.
18.

TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Conm'n, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).
TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1335.

19.
Steven E. Feldman & Sherry L. Rollo, ExtraterritorialProtection of Trade Secret Rights in
China: Do Section 337 Actions at the ITC Really Prevent Trade Secret Theft Abroad?, 11 J. MARSHALL

REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 523, 546 (2012).
See infra Part IV.A.3.
20.
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unfamiliar jurisdictions. By providing a domestic venue for businesses to at
least partially address international violations of their trade secret rights,
the ITC has taken an important, practical step toward addressing
international trade secret espionage. This step has the potential for more
immediate and far-reaching impact than the behind-the-scenes diplomatic
efforts or uncertain legislative efforts that have heretofore been the United
States' primary approach to addressing this problem. Moreover, the tradebased focus that is evident under TianRui is consistent with the approach
that Congress has undertaken for patent law: making it an act of
infringement to import into, sell in, or use in the United States an
21
unpatented component "made by" a process covered by a U.S. patent.
This Article begins in Part II by briefly framing the espionage problem.
In Part III it reviews the prevailing judicial approach to extraterritorial
application of intellectual property laws. It then, in Part IV, analyzes the
TianRui opinion, providing background information on the International
Trade Commission and comparing the proceedings therein to more familiar
actions in federal and state trial courts. In Part V, the Article evaluates the
trade-based alternative highlighted in TianRui that bars infringing products
from entering the U.S. market and suggests it is a reasonable alternative to
the gaping hole that currently exists in the traditional extraterritorial
doctrinal framework. It is consistent with a similar statutory import ban in
patent law, consistent with the U.S. government's sovereign right to control
trade within its borders, and provides a viable, practical, and efficient
alternative for trade secret owners who face foreign misappropriation.
Finally, it concludes in Part VI that this approach is a necessary step toward
providing a meaningful remedy for domestic victims of extraterritorial
misappropriation.
II. THE BACKDROP OF ESPIONAGE
International espionage of American trade secrets is reportedly a
growing problem with wide-ranging significance implicating national
security, economic, and political interests. The problem continues to
receive increasing attention.22 On Wednesday, February 20, 2013, for
example, the Obama White House announced new efforts to combat

21.
See discussion regarding the Patent Process Amendment Act of 1988 and
Part III.B.2.
22.

§ 271(g)

infra at

See generally, e.g., David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly

Important, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.1 1091 (2012); O'Hara, supra note 3 at 241-42 ("Although threats of
economic and industrial espionage have long existed, the international proliferation of the Internet

makes cyber economic and industrial espionage an especially daunting and potentially economycrippling threat.").
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international theft of U.S. trade secrets.23 The White House coordinator of
intellectual property enforcement set forth the "whole government" efforts
the White House would employ to combat theft of U.S. trade secrets
abroad.24 The announced strategy included five components: diplomatic
"soft pressure" for the U.S. and a coalition of like-minded countries; 25
"support [for] industry-led efforts to develop best practices to protect trade
secrets"; 26 a pledge to continue to prioritize investigation and prosecution
of trade secret theft; 27 renewed legislative efforts; and, finally, an attempt to
increase public awareness of trade secret theft and protection. 28
The announcement came on the heels of a report detailing the
"unrelenting campaign of cyberstealing linked to the Chinese
government." 29 The report identified Unit 6139 as an army of hackers run
by the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 30 The report described not a
loose, underground operation but a sophisticated, systematic effort that is
allegedly condoned, supported, and directed by the Chinese government.3 1
The precise numbers and actual extent of espionage are difficult to
ascertain. However, for the purposes of this Article, we accept the premise
that it is a problem and one for which any solution will necessarily be
multi-faceted.32
There is reason to be skeptical of any quick-fix approaches to the
espionage problem, and some observers have so noted. For example, in
response to the government's announced plan, Jason Healey, the director of
the Atlantic Council's Cyber Statecraft initiative, expressed a degree of
optimism but noted that the announced strategy lacked innovation.33 He
pointed out that the announcement used the word continue more than
twenty times and joined Peter Toren, a computer-crimes expert, in calling
23.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Administration Strategy on Mitigating the Theft of

2013),
Secrets
(Feb.
U.S.
Trade
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/adminstrategyonmitigatingthetheftofu.s._tra
de secrets.pdf.
24.

See Espinel, supra note 9; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Launches Effort to Stem Trade-Secret Theft,

2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02WASHINGTON
POST
(Feb.
20,
THE
20/world/37198630_1_trade-secret-theft-trade-secrets-commercial-secrets.
25.
Espinel, supra note 9.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.; see also Nakashima, supranote 24.
Lolita C. Baldor, US Ready to Strike Back on China Cyberattacks, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 19,
29.
2013,
5:43
PM),
http://news.yahoo.com/us-ready-strike-back-china-cyberattacks-224303045-finance.html.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
In a forthcoming article, Professor Rowe will explore the current status of the law and policy
of corporate espionage in greater depth.
33.
Nakashima, supra note 24 ("[T]he strategy contains few new initiatives, [Healey] said,
pointing out that the underlying report uses the word 'continue' more than 20 times.").
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for new laws that would give private parties the right to sue foreign
companies in federal court for trade secret theft and for tougher sanctions
against companies that benefit from the theft of U.S. trade secrets. 34
New legislation is not likely the best means to address the entire scope
of the problems international trade secret theft presents. Recent attempts at
trade legislation have yielded only partial and limited fixes3s and
potentially distract from more effective uses of existing procedural and
substantive tools. This Article explores one such existing tool. The ITC, as
an alternative forum for litigation, presents a reasonable and meaningful
alternative for U.S. trade secret owners hoping to take on the extraterritorial
misappropriation of their trade secrets.
III. THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY PROBLEM

The most noticeable feature of cases addressing extraterritoriality in
trade secret law is their relative scarcity. The few cases that do exist
evaluate extraterritoriality inconsistently and fail to produce a framework
capable of generalized application. The absence of a federal civil trade
secret law raises questions about whether courts should even attempt to
apply state trade secret law to foreign conduct. While the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act has been adopted by a majority of states, it is merely a uniform
law, and it is uncertain whether it meets the apparent general principle of
applying a federal statute or federal law extraterritorially.36
Part A of this section will explore two cases that are representative of
how courts currently approach extraterritoriality in trade secret law in
addition to the limited guidance offered by international treaties. Part B
will compare the approach to extraterritoriality in trade secret law to that
34.
Id.
35.
Consider, for example, the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, which amended
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA) by expanding the scope of prohibited conduct and
increasing the maximum penalties. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112236, 126 Stat. 1627. The amendment closes the loophole identified in United States v. Aleynikov, 676
F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012), by redefining a trade secret to include processes used internally in connection to
services used in commerce.

In addition, the Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012 increased penalties
for violations of the EEA, but only the penalties in § 1831, which targets only trade secret theft intended
to benefit a foreign government, agent, or instrumentality. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty
Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-269, 126 Stat. 2442 (2013).
These amendments, while potentially helpful in a handful of specific contexts, offer only a piecemeal
approach to addressing a problem that would be more effectively and comprehensively addressed by
increasing the usefulness of the laws that already exist. In this way, and by creating a perception that the
problem has been solved, relatively modest legislative modifications have the potential to do more harm
than good.

In any event, whether or not the White House's approach will be successful, its efforts demonstrate that
foreign infringement of U.S. trade secrets is a large-scale problem in need of a comprehensive solution.
See Morrison v. Nat'l Aust. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
36.
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taken in two other areas of intellectual property-namely, patent and
trademark law. Part C will briefly mention why international treaties, in
particular the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, are not instructive or helpful in addressing the extraterritoriality
problem.
A. Existing Landscape in Trade Secrecy
The following two cases demonstrate the wide divergence in the
manner courts apply U.S. trade secret laws to redress extraterritorial
misappropriation. In the absence of a coherent framework, courts have
struggled to find consistency, which, in turn, has left trade secret owners
unsure of the extent of their enforceable rights. In addition to the
uncertainty already attendant to trade secret enforcement, 37 trade secret
owners must address unpredictable procedural hurdles wholly independent
from substantive trade secret law.
1. BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corp. 38
Formosa illustrates the procedural hurdles that can interfere with a
plaintiffs ability to enforce its trade secret rights against foreign
misappropriation. In Formosa, the court considered the allegation that
Formosa Chemical & Fibre Corporation (Formosa Chemical) had copied
secret designs for a plant that BP had provided to a licensee in China. 9
While the copying of BP's trade secrets occurred in Taiwan, BP sought to
enjoin Formosa Chemical from taking possession of and exporting
equipment manufactured using the secret designs in the United States.40
Formosa Chemical intended to use the equipment in the construction of a
plant in Taiwan.4 1
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that even assuming BP's
claims arose under federal law, the district court lacked personal
jurisdiction over Formosa Chemical.42 The court found that "the primary
tortious conduct giving rise to BP's claim," the misappropriation of its
secret designs, occurred in Taiwan and that the resulting injury was felt by

37.
See generally, e.g., Richard F. Dole, Jr., Permanent Injunctive Relief for Trade Secret
Misappropriation Without an Express Limit upon Its Duration: The Uniform Trade Secrets Act

Reconsidered, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 173 (2011) (discussing the conflict in case law concerning the
duration and permanence of injunctions resulting from trade secret misappropriation).

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

BP Chem. Ltd. v. Formosa Chem. & Fibre Corp., 229 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
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BP in the United Kingdom.4 3 The court found that Formosa Chemical's
contacts with the United States-which included contracts with equipment
suppliers 44 and related correspondence-did not demonstrate purposeful
availment of the privilege of conducting business in the United States. 45 It
observed that the United States had little, if any, interest in adjudicating a
dispute between two non-citizens regarding conduct in Taiwan and injury
in the United Kingdom.46 For similar reasons, the court found Formosa
Chemical's contacts with the United States not "continuous and
systematic" and determined that they could therefore not support general
jurisdiction, either.47
With Formosa Chemical removed from the case, the court still had to
consider the domestic manufacturer of the allegedly-infringing equipment.
Even in the absence of jurisdictional questions, the court reversed the
district court's entry of a preliminary injunction based on choice-of-law
considerations. 4 8 Even if New Jersey laW 4 9 would be the source of the
general rule for trade secret misappropriation, as the district court had
found, the district court erred by not evaluating the conflicts of laws on an
issue-by-issue basis.50 Every element of the claim, including the
determination of what constitutes a protectable trade secret and what
conduct amounts to wrongful misappropriation, must be analyzed
separately.5 1
After undertaking this separate analysis, the court concluded that
Taiwan had the greater interest in its laws defining what is protectable and
what is misappropriation.52 These issues would influence both "the
development of new technology" in Taiwan and "the willingness of foreign
companies to share their technology with Taiwanese businesses." 5 3 In
comparison, the court considered New Jersey's interest "to be virtually

43.

Id. at 261.

44.

The court noted that these contracts were solicited and negotiated in Taiwan. Id. at 257-58.

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 261 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 264.

49.
Torts:

At the time of the decision, New Jersey followed the rule stated in the Restatement (First) of

One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the
other if. . . (c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a
[trade] secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the third
person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the other. RESTATEMENT

(FIRST) OF TORTS

§ 757 (1939).

In conflict-of-laws parlance, the notion that different sources of law can determine different
50.
issues within the same case is termed depeqage. 15A C.J.S. Conflict ofLaws § 35 (2014).

51.
52.
53.

Formosa, 229 F.3d at 265.
Id. at 265-66.
Id.
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nil."54 The court therefore found that Taiwanese law governed and
remanded the case to be reconsidered in light of this determination.
This case demonstrates two of the common procedural hurdles
presented by actions based on foreign misappropriation: personal
jurisdiction and choice of law. Each of these issues requires a subjective
analysis, the outcome of which is difficult for a trade secret owner to
predict. The analysis is further complicated by the prospect of the
application of law from virtually any jurisdiction. Even when an infringer
takes advantage of U.S. manufacturers to produce equipment derived from
misappropriation, jurisdictional boundaries can shield the infringer, and
even domestic defendants benefit from an intimidating mire of foreign and
domestic laws.
2.

Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Huawei Technologies, Co., Ltd.

56

If Formosa demonstrates the difficulties a trade secret owner might
encounter in enforcing its rights, Cisco demonstrates the other end of the
spectrum. In Cisco, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief against a Chinese
defendant on both copyright and trade secret theories, the latter relating to
use of its source code. 5 7 At the outset, the court deftly avoided the choiceof-law analysis featured in Formosaby reasoning that "[i]n the absence of
sufficient proof.

.

. of the foreign principles of law,.. . the law of the

forum should be applied." 58 In other words, because the parties did not
discuss Chinese law sufficiently, the court simply applied Texas law by
default. This seems a far less rigorous choice-of-law analysis than that
employed by the Third Circuit in Formosa.
After finding a preliminary injunction appropriate using Texas law
across the board, the court then considered the injunction's scope. As to
related copyright claims, the court limited its order to the United States, but
in the portions of the order addressing the trade secret source code, the
court issued a worldwide injunction against use, reproduction,
dissemination, etc., with no discussion of the source of the court's ability to
regulate conduct extraterritorially. 59
Id.
54.
55.
The court was unable to determine whether Taiwanese and New Jersey law differed on the
record before it. Id. at 268.
56.
Cisco Sys., Inc. v. Huawei Tech., Co., 266 F. Supp. 2d 551 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
57.
'Source code' refers to "any fully executable description of a software system." Mark
Harman, Why Source Code Analysis and Manipulation Will Always Be Important, 10 IEEE INT'L
WORKING CONF. ON SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS & MANIPULATION 2 (2010), available at
http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/M.Harman/scaml0.pdf.

58.
Cisco, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (quoting Symonette Shipyards Ltd. v. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 468
(5th Cir. 1966) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
59.
Id. at 557-58.
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In contrast to Formosa, the court in Cisco applied domestic law and
crafted worldwide relief despite its own recognition that Chinese law could
have applied had the parties raised it. 60 In Formosa, the court reversed a
preliminary injunction by evaluating which jurisdictions had the greatest
interest in regulating the conduct at issue, a question the Cisco court
ignored. It is easy to see how this broad divergence not only in outcomes,
but in the very approach the courts take to foreign-misappropriation
actions, creates practical and legal difficulties for a trade secret owner
seeking to enforce its rights.61 On largely similar fact patterns, the courts in
Formosa and Cisco alternatively found themselves (a) incapable of any
action for lack of a jurisdictional connection and bound to apply Taiwanese
law, and (b) empowered to enter a worldwide injunction applying domestic
law simply as a default.
B. Extraterritorialityin OtherAreas ofIntellectual Property
There are a number of U.S. statutory schemes-e.g., admiralty law,62
antitrust law,63 and securities regulation6 4 -that have been interpreted to
apply exterritorialy. This interpretation has not been applied, however, in
intellectual property (IP) law. This section will explore the ways in which
two other IP areas-trademark law and patent law-have attempted to
address exterritorial concerns. That analysis reveals an overall trend toward
extraterritorial reach in IP, but one that is inconsistent and patchy.
Trademark law has attempted to expand through case law development
while patent law has expanded by statutory development.
1.

TrademarkLaw

Trademark law was the first intellectual property regime to attempt to
assert potentially transnational application. However, despite its very broad

60.

Id. at 555.

61.

See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Introducinga Takedown for Trade Secrets on the Internet, 2007 Wis.

L. REV. 1041, 1088-89 (2007).
18 U.S.C. § 7(1) (2012).
62.
63.

See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Extraterritorialityin U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67

ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 159 (1999) ("Extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust and competition laws has
become routine in both the United States and the European Union.").
64.

See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritorialityof

American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 207, 208 (1996) ("[T]he United States often
applies its own domestic laws extraterritorially to transactions in other countries, justifying its actions as

necessary to protect American investors and the integrity of U.S. capital markets."). But see Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264-65 (2010) (overturning the prevailing view that section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act applies to non-U.S. securities).
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jurisdictional grant, the issue of the Lanham Act' s65 extraterritorial reach
went unresolved until Steele v. Bulova Watch Co. 6 6 Bulova presented the
question "whether a United States District Court has jurisdiction to award
relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement
and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citizen and
resident of the United States." 67 In Bulova, the Bulova Watch Company
sued Steele, a U.S. citizen residing in San Antonio, over a watch business
he conducted in Mexico. 6 8 Although Steele, "without Bulova's
authorization and with the purpose of deceiving the buying
public . .. stamped the name 'Bulova' on watches" he assembled and sold
in Mexico, the district court dismissed Bulova's claim because Steele "had
committed no illegal acts within the United States."69
After the Court of Appeals reversed, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address extraterritoriality under the Lanham Act for the first
time. 70 The Court first pointed out that, "in prescribing standards of
conduct for American citizens [Congress] may project the impact of its
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States." 7 1 The question
was therefore one "of exercised congressional power, not the limitations
upon that power itself." 72 To answer this question, the Court looked to the

broad jurisdictional language in the Act,73 and despite the general rule that
the laws of the U.S. will not extend beyond the boundaries of the United
States, it found that the particular facts at issue fell within the Lanham
Act's jurisdictional scope.74
Despite the fact that the actual affixation of the infringing mark
occurred abroad and none of Steele's domestic purchases violated U.S. law,
the Court noted that "[t]hey were essential steps in the course of business
consummated abroad" and therefore lost their legal character because they
were part of an unlawful scheme.75 In reaching its holding, however, the
Court made several potentially crucial observations that limited Bulova's
application to other fact patterns. For example, the Court observed that

65.

Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

§ 1051 (2012)).
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See Witherell, supranote 8, at 204-05.
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 281 (1952).
Id.
Id. at 281-82.
Id. at 282.
Id.
Id. at 283.

"The statute's expressed intent is 'to regulate commerce within the control of Congress by
73.
making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce . . . .' Bulova, 344

U.S. at 283 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
74.
Id. at 285.
Id. at 287.
75.

§ 1127 (2012)).
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because Mexican courts had nullified Steele's Mexican registration of
'Bulova,' "there [was] thus no conflict which might afford [Steele] a
pretext that such relief would impugn foreign law." 76 After Bulova, courts
were left with little guidance in setting the metes and bounds of the
Lanham Act's extraterritorial effect except insofar as a case presented the
same factual scenario; specifically, a U.S. defendant whose conduct,
though occurring abroad, affected U.S. commerce, and an absence of a
conflict between U.S. and foreign law.77
The Second Circuit attempted to articulate a framework based on
Bulova but was unable to produce a bright-line rule. 8 Instead, it could only
state that "the absence of one of the [Bulova] factors might well be
determinative and that the absence of [two] is certainly fatal." 7 9 In Vanity
Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. sued T. Eaton and
his eponymous corporate entity for infringing its VANITY FAIR trademark
for women's underwear.80 Vanity Fair had been using the mark since 1914
in the United States and since 1917 in Canada.8 ' Eaton, meanwhile, was a
Canadian retailer with an established place of business in New York who
had registered VANITY FAIR as a trademark for women's apparel
generally in Canada in 1915.82 Considering these and other details, the
court attempted to determine whether the defendant was subject to the
Lanham Act under Bulova. 83 Ultimately, the court held that he was not
because the defendant was not a U.S. citizen and because there was
arguably a conflict between U.S. and Canadian law with respect to
ownership of the VANITY FAIR trademark.84 The only factor present was
a "substantial effect on United States commerce," which the court decided
was not enough.
In Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, a case involving the U.S. and
German holders of the mark BAYER for their pharmaceutical products,86
the German entity, Bayer AG, lost ownership of the mark in the United
States when its U.S. subsidiary was seized during World War I, and
controversy over the mark persisted since it was acquired by Sterling in

76.

Id. at 289.

77.

See Witherell, supra note 8, at 206.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956).
Id. at 643.
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 641-43.
Vanity FairMills, Inc., 234 F.2d at 642.

85.
Id. It is important to note that the Second Circuit looked for a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce, which appears to be a higher standard than the one applied in Bulova.

86.

Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 736-37 (2d Cir. 1994).
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1918. Sterling and Bayer entered into a series of agreements delineating
the extent to which Sterling would allow Bayer to use the BAYER mark in
the United States.88 As Bayer increased its use of the mark in the United
States over time, Sterling eventually filed suit against it for breaching their
agreements concerning the mark and for violating the Lanham Act.8 9
After a bench trial, the district court found for Sterling on both the
contract and Lanham Act claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 90 The
issue then became the scope of the remedy. The district court had entered
an injunction that, "[w]ith a few narrow exceptions, . . . broadly enjoined
Bayer AG and its subsidiaries from using the 'Bayer' mark in the United
States, or even abroad if such foreign use might make its way to the
American public." 91 The injunction contained detailed restrictions on
Bayer's use of the mark all over the world, including limiting Bayer to "not
more than two press releases a year 'exclusively concerning extraordinary
events involving Bayer AG, such as changes in corporate control,"' and
allowing
press conferences held abroad and attended primarily by foreign
journalists if (1) such press conferences were not conducted in
English; (2) the subject of the conference did not include "any
discovery, invention, activity, event, product or service within the
United States"; or (3) the conferences related exclusively to Bayer
AG's worldwide activities, without any special prominence given
to either health care matters or Bayer AG's activities within the
United States.9 2
During the press conferences, the injunction required Bayer to "instruct
the attending journalists not to use the 'Bayer' name in the United States in
connection with the subject matter of the press conference." 93
Remarkably, the district court granted this injunction with its
"extensive extraterritorial effects" without any consideration under Vanity
Fair of whether the Lanham Act afforded it the authority to do so.94
However, rather than "appl[y] the Vanity Fairtest mechanically," the court
allowed for a more relaxed application "when the plaintiff seeks the more

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739-44.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 14 F.3d at 744 (emphasis added).
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745 n.6.
Id. at 746.
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modest goal of limiting foreign uses that reach the United States." 95 Of
central importance to the court's ruling was "the Lanham Act's goals of
protecting American consumers against confusion, and protecting holders
of American trademarks against misappropriation of their marks."96 The
court explained that "[t]hough Congress did not intend the Lanham Act to
be used as a sword to eviscerate completely a foreign corporation's foreign
trademark, it did intend the Act to be used as a shield against foreign uses
that have significant trademark-impairing effects upon American
commerce." 97
Although many circuits followed the Second Circuit's lead in applying
Bulova, they have not done so uniformly. 98 Other circuits have adopted
alternative approaches. 99 Notably, the First Circuit adopted a test that seems
to depend solely on whether "the conduct [at issue] has a substantial effect
on United States commerce." 00 The McBee court explicitly rejected Vanity
Fair, stating that although the Vanity Fairtest considers substantial effects
as part of a three-part test, "[w]e differ from the Vanity Fair court in that
we disaggregate the elements of its test: we first ask whether the defendant
is an American citizen, and if he is not, then we use the substantial effects
test as the sole touchstone to determine jurisdiction."' 0 ' The McBee
approach would then be to consider issues of comity on a prudential, rather
than jurisdictional, basis.1 0 2
From the seed of Bulova a plethora of related tests have sprung up,
each incorporating similar elements-citizenship of the defendant, comity,
effect on U.S. commerce-but in inconsistent and at times unpredictable
ways. Appropriately, trademark law does recognize the reality that its
subject matter cannot be meaningfully regulated without addressing
extraterritorial conduct. However, Congress's jurisdictional grant was
perhaps too expansive, leaving the courts to articulate the Lanham Act's
territorial limits. Congress provided no guidelines to courts or to those

95.

Id. (noting that a mechanical application of the Vanity Fair test would have precluded the

extraterritorial aspects of the injunction because in other jurisdictions, including Germany, Bayer held
superior legal rights to the mark).

96.
97.

Id.
SterlingDrug, Inc., 14 F.3d at 746.

See, e.g., Witherell, supra note 8, at 209 ("In the years following the establishment of the
98.
Vanity Fairtest, district courts have continually relaxed the components of the three-pronged test.").

99.
See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Aeropower Co., 34 F.3d 246, 250-51 (4th Cir. 1994);
Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., 970 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1992); Am. Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice
Growers, 701 F.2d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1983); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d
406, 428 (9th Cir. 1977) (requiring some effect on U.S. commerce rather than a substantialeffect); see
also GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION: LAW AND

POLICY 441-42 n.4 (2d ed. 2007).
McBee v. Delica Co., Ltd., 417 F.3d 107, 120 (1st Cir. 2005).
100.
101.
Id. at 121.
Id.
102.
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seeking to protect their intellectual property, and predictably, the outcome
has been inconsistency across and even within circuits. Thus, on the whole,
trademark law succeeds in duly recognizing the significance of exterritorial
conduct, but it fails to provide a sufficient jurisdictionalhook to put all of
the relevant actors on notice of their rights and potential liabilities with
respect to the laws of the United States.
Before turning to patent law, a brief discussion of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)10 3 is warranted. The
ACPA, enacted in 1999, allows a trademark owner to bring a cause of
action against an individual who registers an Internet domain name
containing a trademark for the purpose of selling the domain rather than
hosting a legitimate website. 104 Part of the ACPA's novelty is the ability it
provides plaintiffs to proceed in rem against the domain name without
obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' 0 5 This is an additional
mechanism by which a trademark plaintiff can reach extraterritorial
conduct, though only in the narrow case of use of a trademark in a domain
name.
2. PatentLaw
Unlike trademark law, patent law has historically been territorial in
nature. 106 This reflects the fundamental understanding of patent law as a
social contract rather than a codification of natural rights. The Supreme
Court, for example, has noted that "[t]he patent monopoly was not designed
to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge."l0 7 In order to
"foster and reward invention" and "promote[] disclosure of
inventions . . [that] permit the public to practice the invention once the
patent expires," society concedes a temporary monopoly not as an
inventor's entitlement but as fair consideration for the aforementioned
benefits.108 In light of this understanding of patent law, patent laws should
only be effective against the parties to the social contract, and

103.
104.
105.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
Id.
The need to proceed in rem in an ACPA claim has been obviated somewhat by the Uniform

Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, which allows a trademark owner to obtain transfer or
cancellation of a domain name that uses a trademark in bad faith without establishing a government's
jurisdiction over a defendant. See Bradley P. Hartman, The UDRP and the ACPA: Two Remedies to
Combat Domain Name Cybersquatting, 49 ARIZ. ATT'Y, Mar. 2013, at 38, 39. Moreover, UDRP

proceedings can often be resolved more quickly and cheaply than ACPA claims. Id.
See Bradley, supranote 5, at 507-08 nn.8-9.
106.
107.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
108.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
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extraterritorial practice of an invention is generally not actionable under
U.S. patent law. 109
Nevertheless, in 1984 Congress amended the Patent Act in a manner
that increased its extraterritorial reach."o Congress's action came as a
response to a scenario described in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram
Corp., in which a domestic entity avoided infringement by selling the
components of a patented technology abroad rather than the finished
product."' Because the components were not combined within the United
States, there was no direct infringement; without underlying direct
infringement, the defendant could not be guilty of induced or contributory
infringement.1 2 Thus, domestic entities could avoid liability merely by
saving the last step in manufacturing a patented article for completion
overseas." 3
In response to the Court's holding in Deepsouth,l 4 Congress enacted
§ 271(f) of the Patent Act,"'5 which defines the Deepsouth scenario-i.e.,
the supplying of the components of a patented invention in a manner that
induces would-be infringement outside of the United States-as
infringement. Congress avoided the extension of patent rights beyond the
United States and instead used domestic activity as a hook to reach foreign
activity that caused domestic harm. Nevertheless, to the extent inducement
of infringement requires activity that would constitute an underlying direct
infringement if it occurred in the United States, courts are required to

109.
See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972), superseded by
statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2004), as recognized in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Tech., Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118 n.4 (2014) ("Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; 'these
acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the United States' and
we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over our markets." (intemal citations
omitted)).
110.
See Lauren Shuttleworth, Is 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) Keeping Pace with the Times?: The Law
after the Federal Circuit's Cardiac Pacemakers Decision, 29 J.L. & COM. 117, 119 (2010) (citing
§ 271(f) as one of the "limited exceptions to the territorial limit of patent laws").
Ill.
See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co., 406 U.S. at 524. ("[Defendant] in all respects save final
assembly of the parts 'makes' the invention. It does so with the intent of having the foreign user effect
the combination without [the patent holder's] permission. [Defendant] sells these components as though
they were the machines themselves; the act of assembly is regarded, indeed advertised, as of no
importance.").
112.
Id. at 526. ("Certainly if [Defendant]'s conduct were intended to lead to use of patented
deveiners inside the United States its production and sales activity would be subject to injunction as an
induced or contributory infringement. But it is established that there can be no contributory
infringement without the fact or intention of a direct infringement.").
113.
Id. at 531-32; see also Michael Silhasek, Closing One Loophole and Opening Another: Why

§ 271(f

Patent Infringement Should Apply to Method Patentsafter Cardiac Pacemakers, 48 SAN DIEGO

L. REv. 677, 679 (2011).
114.
Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 576 F.3d 1348, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("In
response to Deepsouth, Congress enacted Section 271(f).").
115.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012).
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scrutinize foreign conduct in order to determine whether a defendant has
violated § 271(f).
The practical significance of § 271(f) is mitigated by the apparent
dearth of cases brought under it,11 6 and its impact has been curtailed further
by the Federal Circuit's holding in CardiacPacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude
Medical, Inc., which precluded its application to method claims." All the
same, § 271(f) was a manifestation of Congress's understanding that in the
modem global economy courts cannot fully vindicate the purposes
underlying the intellectual property laws without considering
extraterritorial conduct.
Congress took a second step in the same direction when it passed
§ 271(g) four years later in 1988."' "Prior to 1988, a patentee holding a
United States patent claiming a method or process of making products had
no cause of action if others used the method overseas to manufacture
products and then imported, used or sold the products in the United
States."' 19 Congress sought to remedy this situation by creating liability for
anyone who "imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or uses
within the United States" a product made by a patented process, regardless
of where the making of the product occurred. 12 0
Mindful of the potentially broad impact of § 271(g), Congress included
two escape clauses that preclude liability if the product made by the
patented process "(1) . . . is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) . .. becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another

product." 2 1 Still, § 271(g)'s application is far reaching and not always
intuitive. For example, if a relatively inexpensive computer chip-costing
say, $2-is manufactured by a patented process and incorporated into the
transmission of an automobile with a far greater cost-say, $30,000importation of the automobile into the United States would be an act of
infringement.
Unfortunately, the statute does not attempt to define a "material
change" or a "trivial and nonessential component," nor is it clear what role

116.

Timothy F. Myers, Foreign Infringement of Business Method Patents, 7 WILLAMETTE J.

INT'L L. & DisP. RES. 101, 109 (2000).
CardiacPacemakers, 576 F.3d at 1365.
117.
118.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012); see also Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107.
M. Patricia Thayer & Michelle M. Umberger, Enforcing U.S. Method Patents: How Much
119.
ProtectionDoes 35 U.S.C. Section 271(g) Really Provide?, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 85, 85 (2003).
120.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012).
121.
Id. § 271(g)(l)-(2). Notably, it is unclear whether these defenses would apply to actions
under 19 U.S.C. § 337 for importation of products made by virtue of an unfair method of competition.
See infra Part IV.A.1; see also generally Siddharth Fernandes, A Realistic Analysis of§ 271(g) and the
ITC: Academic Hypotheses Aside,

§ 271(g)

Does Not Violate the Paris Convention or TRIPS Because

Its Affirmative Defenses Do Not Apply to § 337 Actions Before the ITC, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 473 (2008).
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the manufacturer who used the patented process must, play in the
subsequent importation for liability to attach. 122 In addition, recovery under
§ 271(g) is complicated by the notice provisions of § 287, diminishing
§ 271(g)'s usefulness. 12 3 Practical and interpretational difficulties aside,
however, it is clear that with § 271(g) Congress again created a statute that
places focus on extraterritorial conduct but uses a territorial hookimportation into the United States-to rein in its potential extraterritorial
effect. An individual is free to infringe a U.S. process patent in foreign
territory. It is only to the extent that the products of that infringement
interact with the United States via importation that U.S. patent laws come
into play.
Recent patent case law has also appeared to continue the trend toward
expansion of the extraterritorial reach of U.S. patents, and Professor
Timothy Holbrook has provided excellent analyses of the implications of
these cases.1 24 U.S. patent law still features holes in protection, 12 5 and calls
for increased harmonization of U.S. and international patent protection
persist.126 However, the international community has struggled to make
intellectual property rights uniform across national boundaries, with IPinfringing countries resisting international standards and IP exporters
negotiating enhanced agreements 2 7 with trade partners.1 2 8 Thus, moving
away from strict territoriality and toward an effects-based approach may be
a more feasible way to facilitate the protection of intellectual property in
the modern economy.
C. InternationalTreaties
Trade secret owners concerned with international misappropriation
may look to international treaties, but in practice they provide limited
guidance or assistance in extraterritorial matters. The primary source of
international law governing intellectual property rights is the Agreement on
122.

See

§ 271(g)(1)-(2).

3 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 12:34 (4th ed. 2003).
124.
See Holbrook, supra note 2, at 1099-1111; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential
ExtraterritorialConsequences ofAkamai, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 499, 506-12 (2012).
123.

125.
See Matthew Barthalow, Note, Bayer AG v. Housey Pharmaceuticals: Protection for
Biotechnological Research Tools under Section 271(g) Found Wanting, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 95, 95-98

(2005); Thayer & Umberger, supra note 119 at 94-95.
126.
Jacob Mackler, Intellectual PropertyFavoritism: Who Wins in the GlobalizedEconomy, the
Patent or the Trade Secret?, 12 WAKE FOREST J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 288 (2012) (quoting
Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from

Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 616 (1997)).
127.
See infra Part III.C. (discussing "TRIPS-plus" agreements).
128.
See Beatrice Lindstrom, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Property
Provisions in Trade Agreements and Implicationsfor Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.

917, 920 (2010).
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Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 129
promulgated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. TRIPS sets
a "minimum standard requiring members to implement national IP
protection" and has become an "international standard for IP protection."' 30
However, in seeking to satisfy everyone, TRIPS' one-size-fits-all approach
has run a substantial risk of satisfying no one.
Lesser-developed countries, whose interests typically run counter to
more stringent protection of intellectual property, have sought extensions
on the dates by which they must provide comprehensive IP protection, seen
by some as a "first step towards challenging the existing TRIPS status
quo."l31 Meanwhile, developed nations, whose interests coincide with
strong IP protection and enforcement, have routinely replaced TRIPS'
multilateral approach with bilateral agreements that require signatory
countries to enact domestic IP laws that provide protections exceeding
those provided under TRIPS. 13 2 These so-called "TRIPS-plus" agreements
are controversial1 33 and emblematic of the struggle to establish international
IP protections that are both uniform and satisfactory.
Until these political and diplomatic complications can ultimately (if
ever) be resolved, the trade-based approach explored in this Article can
serve as a viable and concrete middle ground for addressing cross-border
misappropriation. Indeed, it is noteworthy that the type of exclusion order
barring importation of infringing products discussed in this Article has
been determined by the WTO to be compliant with TRIPS and the equal
treatment required for foreign persons by the Paris Convention. 13 4 This
further bolsters the support already provided under U.S. jurisprudence for a
trade-based approach to the extraterritorial dilemma.
IV. TIANRUI AND THE ITC

Turning to trade secret law, in contrast to patent and trademark law,
there has been essentially no effort to develop a comprehensive statutory
framework empowering trade secret owners to combat extraterritorial

129.
See Ping-Hsun Chen, Cross-StraitsEconomic CooperationFramework Agreement, CrossStrait Agreement on Intellectual PropertyRight Protectionand Cooperation, and Implications of OneChina, 36 Hous. J. INT'L. L. 59, 66-67 (2014).
130.
Id.; see also Beatrice Lindstrom, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual
PropertyProvisions in Trade Agreements and Implicationsfor Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L

L. & POL. 917, 919 (2010).
131.

Anselm Kamperman Sanders, Intellectual Property, Free Trade Agreements and Economic

Development, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 893, 902 (2007).
132.
See Lindstrom, supra note 128, at 919.
133.
See id. at 972-77.
134.

See Ron Vogel, The Great Brain Robbery: Tianrui and the Treatment of Extraterritorial

Unfair Trade Acts, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 641, 671-72 (2013).
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misappropriation. Because trade secrets are regulated by the states rather
than the federal government, there is no federal scheme Congress can
modify-the way it has for patents and trademarks-to address
extraterritorial issues endemic to an increasingly global economy.
However, in the recent case of TianRui Group Co. v. InternationalTrade
Commission,1 35 the Federal Circuit approved a means of addressing foreign
misappropriation of trade secrets that bears significant similarities to
similar approaches in patent and trademark law-more specifically,
permitting extraterritorial application of U.S. law premised on the
jurisdictional hook of importation into the United States.
In TianRui, the Federal Circuit affirmed the International Trade
Commission's determination that certain railway wheels should be barred
from importation into the United States under section 337 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 because they were the product of extraterritorial trade secret
misappropriation.136 This section will analyze the reasoning and
implications of the Federal Circuit's opinion. To facilitate this analysis and
to put TianRui in the appropriate context, the Article will first provide
background information on the International Trade Commission and the
section 337 proceedings that occur therein.
A.

Background on the InternationalTrade Commission

The United States International Trade Commission (ITC) is a quasijudicial federal agency established as the United States Tariff Commission
in 1916.137 Created at a time of resurgent protectionism in the United
States, the Commission's primary focus was to "investigate the
administration and fiscal and industrial effects of the customs laws of [the
United States] now in force or which may be hereafter enacted" and to
otherwise "investigate the tariff relations between the United States and
foreign countries."l3 The Tariff Act targeted unfair competition in section
316, the precursor to today's section 337.139 Section 316 gave the President
discretionary authority to impose an "additional duty" of up to fifty percent
of the cost of imported goods or, in extreme cases, direct that certain items
be "excluded from entry into the United States." 4 0 Such an order would
follow a recommendation by the Commission, after an investigation and a

135.
136.
137.
138.

TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Conun'n, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1323-24.
See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, title Vll, § 700, 39 Stat. 795, 795.
Id. §§ 702, 704, 39 Stat. 795, 796; see also S. Alex Lasher, The Evolution of the Domestic

Injury Requirement in Section 337 Investigations Before the United States International Trade

Commission, 18 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 157, 159 (2010).
See Revenue Act of 1916, § 316.
139.
140.
Id. § 316(e).
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hearing, of "unfair methods of competition [or] unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States . . the effect or tendency of
which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States."l41 "Unfair methods of
competition" included infringement of U.S. patents and trademarks.1 4 2
In the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Congress replaced section
316 with section 337.143 Section 337 largely replicated the old section 316,
with the omission of the provision authorizing the President to impose
additional duties.144 Although Congress and the President believed that
section 337's flexibility to address all varieties of "unfair competition"
made it the most effective means of protecting domestic industries,1 45 it
was relatively seldom used,1 4 6 and only recently has the number of
investigations under section 337 grown substantially.1 47 Perhaps because of
the United States' dominant position in the industrial world following
World War II, it was not until growth slowed and imports increased in the
1970s that Congress again gave substantial attention to section 337.148
Thus, in the Trade Act of 1974, Congress modernized the
Commission,1 49 including by giving it its present name, the International
Trade Commission. 50 Congress hoped to revitalize section 337 by
remedying the procedural problems that, since its inception, made it
difficult to utilize.' 5 ' In addition to formalizing the procedural rules of
section 337 adjudications by conforming them to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act,1 52 the Trade Act effected the following
141.
Id. § 316(a).
142.
Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 250 (C.C.P.A. 1930) ("The complaint [filed
on December 16, 1925] was based, in part, upon the alleged violation of certain patent rights . . . ."); see
also Lasher, supranote 138, at 159.
143.
See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683 (2012)).
Id. § 337(e). This change left exclusion as the only remedy under section 337, which
144.
comported with the Commission's view, expressed in its 1928 annual report, that exclusion was the
only appropriate remedy for importation of items that infringed U.S. patent rights. Lasher, supra note
138, at 159 n.20.
145.
See Lasher, supra note 138, at 160 nn.23-25. Despite its flexibility, modem application of
section 337 tends to focus largely on unfair competition stemming from the infringement of intellectual
property, perhaps because other applications have "been delegated to other statutes." Colleen V. Chien,
Patently Protectionist?An EmpiricalAnalysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission,

50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 72 n.38 (2008).
146.
See Chien, supra note 145, at 73; Lasher, supra note 138, at 160 n.26.
147.
See Chien, supranote 145, at 68 n.19.
148.

See Lasher, supra note 138, at 162; see also Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency:

CongressionalRegulation of the ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 541-42 (2009).
149.
See Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, ch. 4, sec. 341, § 337, 88 Stat. 1978, 2053-56
(1974) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2497 (2012)).
150.
Trade Act § 171.
See Chien, supra note 145, at 73.
151.
152.
Trade Act § 341.
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changes: longer terms for the Commissioners, 53 strict time limits on the
duration of an investigation,1 54 the ability not only to restrict importation
but also to halt the domestic distribution of previously imported articles,' 55
and the authority of the Commission to issue remedies directly, subject
only to the President's veto rather than his approval. 56
1.

Section 337 and IntellectualProperty

Although the 1974 changes led to an increase in section 337 cases,' 57
Congress still felt that utilization of section 337 had not provided United
States intellectual property owners with adequate protection against foreign
companies.' 5 8 It further recognized that the United States was no longer a
largely manufacturing-based economy.1 5 9 Congress therefore enacted the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,160 which liberalized
access to section 337 for claims involving intellectual property rights.
With respect to statutory IP-most notably, copyrights, trademarks,
and patents-Congress eliminated the need to demonstrate that the effect of
the unfair act would be to "substantially injure" a domestic industry. 6 In
addition, it eliminated the need to show that the domestic industry affected
was "efficiently and economically operated," language that had been in the
statute dating back to its enactment in 1930.162 Finally, to shed light on
some of the confusion that had emerged regarding the existence of a
domestic industry in the context of statutory IP, Congress provided a more
elaborate definition of "industry" that accommodated its aspects unrelated
to manufacturing. Whereas courts had previously focused on actual
production in the United States,' 63 the 1988 Amendments listed "significant
investment in plant and equipment," "significant employment of labor or

153.
Id. § 171 (longer terms).
154.
Id. § 337 (time limit).
155.
Id. § 337 (cease-and-desist orders).
156.
Id. § 337.
157.
See Chien, supranote 145, at 73.
158.
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1341(a)(2), 102 Stat.
1107, 1211-12 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
159.
See Lasher, supra note 138, at 166-67.
160.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
161.
See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)-(E). Notably, the "substantial injury" requirement still exists
for other unfair acts. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A).
162.
See Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703 (codified as amended at
19 U.S.C. §§ 1202-1683 (2012)).
163.
See, e.g., Schaper Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 717 F.2d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
1983) ("In cases involving the claims of U.S. patents, the patent must be exploited by production in the
United States, and the industry in the United States generally consists of the domestic operations of the
patent owner, his assignees and licensees devoted to such exploitation of the patent." (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 93-571 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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in . .. exploitation,

including

engineering, research and development, or licensing" as dispositive
indicators of domestic industry as applied to articles protected by statutory
IP laws. 16 Importantly, these presumptions do not apply to unfair acts not
involving intellectual property or to trade secrets, which at the federal level
are non-statutory. Unrelated to IP, the 1988 Amendments also added
consent orders to the possible remedies available to the ITCl 6 5 and provided
for the enforcement of judgments through civil penalties in a federal district
court. 166

Although it appears the 1988 Amendments were successful in terms of
increasing utilization of section 337,167 problems arose in the form of
conflicts between general intellectual property law as applied in federal
district and appellate courts and the emerging doctrines applied in section
337 cases before the ITC.'" In addition, international concerns emerged
regarding the potentially discriminatory nature of section 337 proceedings
against foreign respondents.1 6 9 Indeed, in 1988 a panel of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) found that procedural differences
between section 337 proceedings and district court proceedings created an
unfair advantage for domestic goods.1 70
As a result, certain changes were implemented in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act that modified section 337 to its current form.' 7' For
example, the strict time limit was replaced with an instruction that the
Commission should make its determination "at the earliest practicable
time," and rather than prohibiting counterclaims, section 337 now allowed
them to be raised and removed to federal district courts. 172 In addition,
Congress created 28 U.S.C. § 1659, which directed district courts to stay
actions between parties that are also litigating before the ITC and to use the

164.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3)(A)-(C) (2012).
165.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, sec. 1342(a)(2), § 337, 102
Stat. 1107, 1213 (1988) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012)). Authorization of consent
orders allows the ITC to enforce settlement agreements regardless of whether an actual violation of

section 337 had occurred.
166.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (2012).
167.
See G. Brian Busey, An Introduction to Section 337 and the U.S. International Trade
Commission, in 2 PATENT LITIGATION 2008, at 13 (2008), available at WL, 949 PLI/Pat 11; see also

Lasher, supra note 138, at 169 ("Clearly, Congress had achieved its goal of making [s]ection 337
available to a broader variety of American industries . . . .").
168.
See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 148 (discussing the impact of litigation under section 337 on
the coherence of the patent system).
169.
See Chien, supranote 145, at 67-68.
170.
See id. at 77-78.
171.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 321, § 337, 108 Stat. 4809,
4943-46 (1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
172.
Id. § 321 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(l)-(c) (2012)).
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record of the ITC proceedings upon dissolution of the stay.' This
provision aimed to prevent simultaneous litigation of the same issues in
two different forums and to reduce re-litigation of the same issues
following ITC litigation. 17 4
2.

Proceduresfor Investigations Under Section 337

-

A proceeding under section 337 commences with the filing of a
complaint. Once filed, the complaint is reviewed, clarified, and
supplemented upon request by the ITC, and then submitted to the six
who vote on whether to commence an investigation.1
Commissioners,
Often, the complaint is submitted for informal review by ITC staff prior to
its official submission to the Commissioners177 Barring "exceptional
circumstances," the Commissioners reach a decision within thirty days of
filing. If the Commissioners agree to investigate-and they usually do 7 8
they assign the case to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who holds a
hearing in a manner similar to a trial in a federal district court.' 79 When an
investigation is ordered, the ITC issues a notice of institution, which is
published in the Federal Register a few days later.18 0 This publication
marks the official institution of an investigation.' 8 ' After a hearing, the ALJ
issues an initial determination that the Commissioners may review at the
discretion of any one Commissioner,' 82 and, if the ITC finds a violation of
section 337, its final determination is reviewable by the President for
consistency with national trade policies.' 83 The Commissioners' decision is
then appealable to the Federal Circuit.' 84
The Office of Unfair Import Investigations (OUII) and Office of the
General Counsel (OGC) also participate in hearings.8 8 The OUI

173.
174.
(1994).

Id. § 321 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1659 (2012)).
See, e.g., In re Princo Corp., 486 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007); H.R. Rep. No. 103-826

175.
Busey, supra note 167 at 14. The Commissioners "are nominated by the President and are
subject to Senate confirmation. No more than three Commissioners can be from the same political party
and the Commissioners serve overlapping terms of nine years." Id.

176.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 20-21.
177.
Id. at 21.
178.
179.
Id. at 22; 19 C.F.R. § 210.10(a)(1) (2012).
180.
19 C.F.R. § 210.10(b) (2012).
Id.
181.
182.
19 C.F.R. § 210.43(d); Busey, supra note 167, at 27-28.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(j) (2012); Thomas A. Broughan, III, Modernizing § 337's Domestic
183.
Industry Requirementfor the Global Economy, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 41, 45 n.30 (2009). The President has
rarely acted on this authority in modem practice. Busey, supra note 167, at 28.

184.
185.

Busey, supra note 167, at 28-29.
Broughan, supranote 183, at 44.
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represents the public interest during hearings and also provides confidential
input to complainants during an informal review of draft complaints prior
to filing.1 86 Meanwhile, the OGC advises the Commissioners in their
reviews of initial determinations by the ALJs.s?
3.

Advantages of Section 337 Proceedings

Section 337 proceedings feature a number of differences between their
counterparts in the federal district courts. To begin with, the ITC has its
own pleading requirements distinct from the liberal pleading rules adopted
in the district courts for the elements of a generic trade secret claim.188 For
example, a proper section 337 complaint must include a separate statement
addressing the impact of the proceeding on the public interest. 189
Additionally, the complaint must "[d]escribe specific instances of alleged
unlawful importations or sales," including the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States item numbers and a description of the domestic trade
or industry affected.1 90 For non-statutory IP, such as a trade secret, the
complaint must "state a specific theory and provide corroborating data"
regarding the threat or effect of substantially injuring a domestic
industry.191 These initial requirements make commencing a section 337
action-particularly one involving non-statutory IP-somewhat more
burdensome than district court actions.
However, once a complaint is accepted and an investigation
commenced, other procedural differences of section 337 actions begin to
favor the complainant. The compressed time frame of a section 337
investigation relative to a district court action increases the speed with
which a trade secret holder can obtain a remedy, reduces litigation
expense,' 92 and can put pressure on the respondent(s) to prepare a defense
quickly enough. While Congress removed the hard-and-fast eighteenmonth time limit, section 337 actions usually take only fifteen to eighteen
months to complete.' 93 In addition, discovery requests typically require a
response within only ten days.' 94 While a prudent complainant will have

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 44-45; see also Busey, supranote 167, at 15.
See Broughan, supra note 183, at 44-45.
See Busey, supranote 167, at 20.
19 C.F.R. § 210.8(b) (2012).
Id. § 210.12(a)(3), (6)(i)-(ii) (2012).
Id. § 210.12(a)(8) (2012).

192.

Although litigation time is reduced, the compressed time-frame may actually harm the

complainant by forcing costs to be "front loaded" rather than spread out over a longer period of
discovery. See Busey, supranote 167, at 36.

193.
194.

See id at 35.
See id. at 20.
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gathered the relevant documents prior to filing a complaint, respondents
will have to work quickly to evaluate and respond to such requests. 95
Another facet of a section 337 action that works to a complainant's
advantage is that the ITC's jurisdiction to issue exclusion orders is
nationwide and in rem over the imported goods.1 96 This eliminates the need
to establish personal jurisdiction over a respondent-a particularly useful
feature when addressing foreign misappropriations-and avoids the
difficulty of collecting monetary judgments against foreign defendants.1 97
And while the potential relief a complainant or plaintiff can seek is
narrower before the ITC than in a traditional trade secret action, the
standard for obtaining injunctive relief is less burdensome in the former
than the latter.' 98 Whereas injunctions relating to trade secret
misappropriation typically require a showing of, inter alia, irreparable
injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law,' 99 the ITC grants
exclusion orders without consideration of the adequacy of a legal remedy
and would possibly only require a showing of injury sufficient to
demonstrate a violation of section 337.200 Finally, although Congress has
amended section 337 to allow counterclaims, 201 these claims must be
removed to a district court.202 Thus, they are not likely to be adjudicated as
rapidly as the primary claim and do not benefit from any of the procedural
distinctiveness of the ITC.

See id.
195.
See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 (C.C.P.A. 1981) ("An
196.
exclusion order operates against goods, not parties. Accordingly, that order was not contingent upon a
determination of personal or 'in personam' jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer. The Tariff Act of
1930 (Act) and its predecessor, the Tariff Act of 1922, were intended to provide an adequate remedy for
domestic industries against unfair methods of competition ... beyond the in personam jurisdiction of
domestic courts."); see also Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 and the GATT: The Problem or the
Solution?, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 779, 789 (1993).
See Chien, supranote 145, at 74-75.
197.
See id at 78-79 nn.92-98.
198.
199.
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); Ruth E. Leistensnider,
Trade Secret Misappropriation:What Is the Proper Length of an Injunction After Public Disclosure?,

51 ALB. L. REv. 271, 280 (1987).
See, e.g., Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio)
200.
Chips, Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets,
Inv. No. 337-TA-543, USITC Pub. 4258, at 62-63 n.230 (Oct. 2011), available at
The Commission found that the 1988
www.usitc.gov/publications/337/pub4258vollof2.pdf.
Amendments to section 337 eliminating the "substantial injury" requirement for statutory IP
demonstrated Congress's intent to abrogate the traditional equitable requirement of irreparable harm.
Although Congress did not eliminate the requirement to show substantial injury with respect to nonstatutory IP-like trade secrets-the same reasoning can be applied to argue that Congress did not
intend exclusion orders, the sole relief available under section 337, to depend on any showing beyond
those listed in the statute.

See, e.g., Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, sec. 321,
201.
4809 (Dec. 8, 1994) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012)).
Id. § 321.
202.

§ 337,

108 Stat.
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Some argue that these differences, on balance, make section 337
proceedings advantageous for plaintiffs.203 Whatever the case, section 337
investigations have become significantly more prevalent in recent years. A
2013 ITC report states that "[s]ection 337 investigations have increased
significantly over the past five years and are expected to remain at elevated
levels."2 04 Throughout the 1990s, the most ITC investigations instituted in a
given year was seventeen. 2 05 Since 2000, the number of investigations has
never been fewer than seventeen, and since 2006, the number has never
fallen below thirty.206 This trend also applies to investigations involving
trade secret claims. In the 1990s, only three trade secret investigations were
instituted, while ten such investigations have been instituted since 2004.207
It is in this context that the Commission decided TianRui and the Federal
Circuit reviewed it.
B. The TianRui Dispute
In TianRui, Amsted Industries, Inc., a domestic manufacturer of
railway wheels, sought to enjoin the importation of wheels produced by
competitors, TianRui Group Company Limited and TianRui Group
Foundry Company Limited (collectively, TianRui), that had allegedly been
manufactured using Amsted's secret process-specifically, the "ABC
process." 2 0 8 The parties had unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a license
in 2005, and after the failed negotiations, TianRui hired away nine
employees from one of Amsted's Chinese licensees.20 9 Some of those
employees had been trained in the ABC process, and all of them had been
advised of their duty not to disclose the company's confidential
information.210 TianRui then partnered with Standard Car Truck Company,
Inc. to market TianRui wheels to U.S. customers.2 1 1
Aside from the merits of the case-i.e., whether TianRui had actually
misappropriated Amsted's trade secrets and whether importation of its
wheels would substantially injure domestic industry-the case turned on
whether the Commission had the authority to apply section 337 to
203.
See, e.g., Chien, supranote 145, at 68. But cf id. at 71.
204.
Facts & Trends Regarding USITC Section 337 Investigations, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.usitc.gov/pressroom/documents/featured news/337facts.pdf.
205.
Number of Section 337 Investigations Instituted by Calendar Year, U.S.. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/cy_337_institutions.pdf (last visited

.

Aug. 18, 2014).
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1323-24 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
209.
Id. at 1324.
210.
Id. ("Eight of the nine employees had also signed confidentiality agreements. .
211.
Id.
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misappropriation that occurred in China. 2 12 TianRui argued that it did not
because Congress did not intend section 337 to apply extraterritorially.213
The Commission's ALJ rejected this argument, finding that "section 337
focuses not on where the misappropriation occurs but rather on the nexus
between the imported articles and the unfair methods of competition." 2 14
This holding was the primary focus of the Federal Circuit's review.2 15
1.

The FederalCircuiton TianRui

The Federal Circuit first rejected the view that it could find domestic
misappropriation based on TianRui's marketing efforts in the United States
because this "use" of Amsted's trade secret could only be viewed as
"misappropriative" by reference to an earlier breach of confidence that
would have occurred in China. 2 16 Thus, the Commission was, in fact,
applying section 337 extraterritorially, and the question was whether such
an application is permissible in light of the general principle of
territoriality.217
In analyzing this question, the court held that the presumption against
extraterritoriality did not apply to section 337 for three reasons. First, the
presumption governs "unless a contrary intent appears,"2 18 and the court
found such an intent in section 337 because it focused on "an inherently
international transaction-importation." 2 19 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that Congress must have intended that the statute would apply to conduct
(or statements) that may have occurred abroad.2 20 Second, the court noted
that the Commission applied section 337 not to sanction purely
extraterritorial conduct but to sanction partially extraterritorial conduct
with a jurisdictional nexus to the United States. 22 1 "Because foreign
conduct is used only to establish an element of a claim alleging a domestic
injury and seeking a wholly domestic remedy, the presumption against

212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 1325.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1326 ("The main issue in this case is whether section 337 authorizes the Commission

to apply domestic trade secret law to conduct that occurs in part in a foreign country.").

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

at 1328 n.1.
at 1328 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1999)).
(internal quotation marks omitted).
at 1329.
(citing United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. 2005)) ("Immigration

statutes, by their very nature, pertain to activity at or near international borders. It is natural to expect
that Congress intends for laws that regulate conduct that occurs near international borders to apply to

some activity that takes place on the foreign side of those borders."); see also United States v. DelgadoGarcia, 374 F.3d 1337, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
221.
TianRui, 661 F.3d at 1324.
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extraterritorial application does not apply." 22 2 Finally, the court looked to
section 337's legislative history, including section 337's predecessor,
section 316.
The court went on to dispel TianRui's concerns that the Commission's
application of section 337 would improperly interfere with Chinese law in
three ways. First, it again pointed to the jurisdictional nexus with the
United States-i.e., the requirement that the goods at issue be imported into
the United States.223 It is only when a party attempts to import the good
into the United States that extraterritorial conduct becomes significant and
only to that extent that a court would enforce principles of U.S. trade
secret-law in other countries. The court also pointed out that TianRui could
not identify any relevant difference between the definition of
misappropriation it applied and principles of misappropriation under
Chinese trade secret law, noting that "China ha[d] acceded to the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights."224
Finally, the Federal Circuit observed that the basis for finding a breach
of confidentiality (and therefore misappropriation) in TianRui's
extraterritorial conduct was not a principle of American law. 225 Rather,
entirely independent from U.S. law, the employees hired by TianRui were
under a contractual duty to their former employer to maintain its
confidences. Importantly, TianRui did not offer any argument that those
contractual duties were against the policy of any jurisdiction, including
China. The court apparently reasoned that extraterritorial enforcement of
section 337 is less likely to interfere with a jurisdiction's own law when the
basis for finding misappropriation is a voluntary contract rather than a duty
imposed by American law.226
It is unclear how much importance the court attached to each of these
reasons. Clearly, the case for application of section 337 would be strongest
when, as in TianRui, there is no conflict with the law of the foreign
jurisdiction and when the misappropriation is based on a breach of a
voluntarily and affirmatively assumed duty of confidence rather than
domestic laws. However, TianRui's reasoning does not foreclose the
possibility that extraterritorial application of section 337 could be upheld
based solely on the court's first reason-i.e., the jurisdictional nexus to the
United States of attempted importation.

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1329.
Id. at 1332.
Id. at 1332-33.
Id.
Id.
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The Dissent

Judge Kimberly Moore dissented from the majority opinion in TianRui,
rejecting the majority's finding of a sufficiently clear intent by Congress to
overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S.
laws.22 7 In the dissent's view, the inherent international nature of
importation of foreign goods was not enough to demonstrate Congress's
extraterritorial intent.228 Judge Moore noted that the statute referred only to
"unfair acts in the importation of articles," not the importation of articles
that resultedfrom unfair acts, and suggested this meant the statute only
applied when the importation of the article itself involved an unfair act.229
By reading section 337 as it did, she feared the majority had expanded the
statute to "staggering" breadth, allowing it to reach goods produced in a
manner that falls short of U.S. labor standards.230
On this last point, the majority's observation that the case involved no
conflict between U.S. and Chinese law may provide a degree of
reassurance. The dissent found the lack of conflict irrelevant, 2 31 but the lack
of conflict would at least exclude many of the scenarios the dissent seemed
to fear. Specifically, applying section 337 extraterritorially only in the
absence of a conflict would preclude exclusion of goods on the basis of
things like a foreign nation's lower minimum wage or other labor
conditions that fall below U.S. standards. While the dissent correctly
pointed out that the presence or absence of a conflict would have no
bearing on the applicability of the presumption against extraterritoriality,2 32
once a court determined that the presumption had been rebutted, as in the
instant case, the presence or absence of a conflict of laws could serve as a
discretionary consideration in determining whether an extraterritorial act
was sufficiently unfair to warrant exclusion under section 337. Arguably,
the local laws of a jurisdiction are informative of whether conduct is
unfair.23 3
In addition to the reasons described above, the dissent voiced a degree
of hostility toward trade secrets in general. For example, the dissent

at
at
at
at

1338.
1339.
1340.
1338.

227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

231.

Id. at 1342 n.8 (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies equally

regardless of whether U.S. and foreign law conflict).
Id.
232.
233.
The majority dealt with the dissent's concern by citing Supreme Court precedent to the
effect that the phrase "unfair methods of competition" generally refers to practices "characterized by

deception, bad faith, fraud or oppression, or [practices] against public policy because of their dangerous
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create monopoly." Id. at 1330 n.3 (quoting FTC v. Gratz, 253
U.S. 421, 427 (1920) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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appeared to fault Amsted for "deny[ing] the public full knowledge of its
innovation while simultaneously exploiting [its] trade secret by licensing it
to a Chinese corporation."234 American law clearly gives society a choice
between protecting its intellectual property with a patent, which requires
public disclosure but grants a period of legally-enforced monopoly, or
under trade secret law, which requires strict secrecy and does not grant a
monopoly, but has the benefit of potential perpetuity. Other than the
benefits and burdens particular to each system, the law does not express a
preference for one over the other. For that reason, it is unclear why
Amsted's legitimate decision to utilize its intellectual property as a trade
secret rather than a patent should have muted Judge Moore's sympathy. 235
Along the same lines, the dissent criticized the majority's holding because
it expanded protection of trade secrets and provided incentives for
inventors to keep their innovation secret rather than getting a patent.236
Similarly, Judge Moore expressed concern that competition would be
harmed and American consumers might not receive the benefit of lower
prices from TianRui's products. 23 7
Whatever the dissent's views toward trade secret law generally, it was
right to focus on whether section 337's text and legislative history make
sufficiently clear Congress's intent to allow courts to consider
extraterritorial conduct in applying the statute. This question incorporates a
fair degree of subjectivity, and it may fall to the Supreme Court to
ultimately settle this issue. Alternatively, Congress always has the ability to
clarify its intent by amending the statute.
V. SECTION

337: A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE

The conflict presented between the territorial nature of our laws and the
global nature of the way we do business is not one for which a one-sizefits-all solution exists. For trade secret law, the absence of a federal civil
cause of action may present another wrinkle. 238 Given these considerations,
and those discussed earlier, section 337 and the focus on trade provides a
reasonable alternative for now and is a positive step toward effective IP

234.
235.

Id. at 1343.
Id. ("My sympathy, however, is somewhat muted since Amsted had a ready-made solution

to its problem: obtain a process patent.... In the alternative, Amsted could have also protected its
intellectual property by keeping the various processes completely secret. Instead, Amsted chose to deny

the public full knowledge of its innovation while simultaneously exploiting the trade secret by licensing
it to a Chinese corporation for use in China.").

236.
237.
238.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1327 (holding that single federal standard governs trade secret issues arising in the

section 337 context). See also supranote 36 and accompanying text.
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protection. It strikes the right balance between having no recourse against
foreign misappropriation through traditional channels on the one hand, and
on the other, a loose interpretation of extraterritoriality that focuses only on
the effect on U.S. commerce, as in trademark law.
The focus on trade is a useful and insightful approach for dealing with
the territoriality quagmire. The remedy under section 337 for trade secret
misappropriation is limited. It bans importation of the accused product into
the United States. It does not prohibit the use of the trade secrets outside of
the country. It is therefore not a cure-all. Because this exclusion order is
limited, it becomes a less offensive remedy than an inappropriate
extraterritorial application of U.S. law by a district court,239 or the grant of
an expansive worldwide injunction.24 0 It therefore regulates conduct that
would be illegal if done in the United States without directly regulating
conduct outside of the United States.
In this vein, it is worth considering exactly how we should define the
extraterritorial application of U.S. law. In one sense, section 337 does not
apply extraterritorially because a Chinese business is free to misappropriate
trade secrets in China with no involvement of U.S. courts. It is only when it
attempts to import goods resulting from the misappropriation into the
United States that it would run afoul of U.S. courts. On the other hand, it is
fair to suggest that any time U.S. law imposes a negative consequence
based on conduct that occurs purely outside U.S. territory, U.S. law is
being applied extraterritorially-the only conduct that determined that
TianRui would not be able to import its products into the United States
occurred in China. However, any number of U.S. laws could conceivably
between
negatively.
Distinguishing
affect
foreign individuals
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws that do or do not have a
jurisdictional hook could therefore be a key to the policy analysis courts
undertake when facing the extraterritoriality problem. Generally, the law
appears to view the imposition of a negative consequence based on
extraterritorial conduct more favorably when it is limited to a context in
which the actor voluntarily establishes a nexus with the United States.
A. Border Control
While extraterritorial application of U.S. law raises important issues of
comity, the TianRui interpretation of section 337, which requires a
jurisdictional hook of importation, counterbalances comity concerns with a
border-control perspective. The emphasis under section 337 is on trade
through the United States' physical borders. The U.S. government has a
239.
240.

See discussion of Formosa Chemicals, supra Part I.A. 1.
See discussion of Formosa Chemicals, supra Part III.A.I.

96

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 66:1:63

sovereign right to control trade and commerce within its borders. 24 1 In so
doing it is also entitled to enforce IP rights in its regulation of trade, and
doing so does not impinge on other countries' sovereignty.242 This is
evident in other areas of the law that seek to regulate and balance trade
against important public policy concerns.
In criminal procedure for instance, there is a border-search exception to
the general constitutional limitations on government searches.243 It is based
on the power granted to Congress under Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."244 This power
has been used to ban prohibited articles and prohibited persons from
entering the United States.245 In light of this power to regulate international
commerce, even American citizens' powerful Fourth Amendment rights are
qualitatively different at the border than inside the country. 246 Similarly,
our immigration policies that bar undocumented immigrants from entry
into the United States, 247 and trademark rights and copyright protections are
enforced by customs officials to ban infringing goods from entering the
United States.248 Clearly then, the importance of the United States' interest
in controlling its borders is often sufficient to counterbalance
countervailing interests, and this should include the general presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.

241.

See generally Paul S. Rosenzweig, Comment, Functional Equivalents of the Border,

Sovereignty, and the FourthAmendment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1129-31 (1985).
242.
See id.
243.
See, e.g., United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding opening of FedEx
package at the functional equivalent of a border even in the absence of individualized suspicion);
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that officials do not require reasonable
suspicion to search electronic storage devices at the border); United States v. Nieves, 609 F.2d 642 (2d
Cir. 1979) (finding, no justification required to search a defendant's shoes beyond his decision to cross a
national boundary).
244.
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 620 ("The border-search exception is
grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign to control . .. who and what may enter the country.").
245.
See Jon Adams, Rights at UnitedStates Borders, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 353, 355 (2005).
246.

For instance, government officials are allowed to conduct routine searches at the U.S. border

even without individual suspicion. They also have the authority to inspect packages and prevent the
introduction of contraband and dangerous goods into the United States. See Christine A. Coletta, Note,
Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border Search Exception to the Fourth

Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971, 979 (2007).
247.

See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. In effect, this border-control approach treats infringing trade

secret goods like illegal aliens at the border with zero tolerance, since the quantity of goods is
irrelevant.
248.
The owner of a federally registered trademark or copyright is entitled to record the mark or

copyright so that infringing goods can be excluded by customs. See 19 CFR

§

133.1-53 (2012).
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B. Similar to PatentLaw's Approach
The focus on trade that is evident under TianRui is consistent with the
approach that Congress has undertaken for patent law. As discussed
above, 24 9 the Process Patent Amendment Act of 1988, contained in
§ 271(g), made it an act of infringement to import into, sell in, or use in the
United States an unpatented component "made by" a process covered by a
U.S. patent. 2 50 Like the TianRui interpretation of section 337, that
legislation focuses on foreign conduct insofar as the patented process was
used in another country. However, the Act has been interpreted to have no
extraterritorial effect because infringement arises only if and when the
product is imported into the United States.2 5 1 Without this amendment, a
competitor could circumvent a U.S. patent that covered the process of
making a product (but not the product itself). 2 52 Section 271(g) has been
interpreted to require that one actually import the product into the United
States. 2 53 A mere possibility of importation is not sufficient.254
An earlier piece of patent legislation in § 271(f) made it an act of
infringement to export a component of a patented product. 2 55 Thus, one
who exports the unassembled components of a patented device and induces
its assembly outside of the United States is an infringer.2 56 These sections
demonstrate the approach through which Congress escapes the
extraterritorial trap by not extending patent rights to conduct that occurs
outside the United States, but instead relies on a domestic act (importation
into or exportation out of the United States) to protect an IP right.
C. Better Tool for Trade Secret Owners
From a practical perspective, the TianRui approach is far preferable to
the lack of a viable means to pursue foreign misappropriators stemming
from the uncertainty of regular civil actions against foreign defendants.
Under the existing legal framework in trade secrecy, the choice-of-law
analysis is subject to significant variation resulting in much uncertainty for

§ 271(g) supra Part I1I.B.2.

249.
250.

See discussion of 35 U.S.C.
35 U.S.C. § 27 1(g).

251.

See Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property:

Lessonsfrom Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 603, 607 (1997).
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
254.
Id.
255.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f); see also Melissa Feeney Wasserman, Note, Divided Infringement:
Expanding the ExtraterritorialScope ofPatentLaw, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 286 (2007).
256.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
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trade secret owners and litigants in the traditional court process.257
Moreover, some courts treat trade secret misappropriation as a tort,
applying the law of the state where the misappropriation took place,2 58
while other courts treat trade secret misappropriation like a breach of
contract and look to the place where the trade secrets were created or where
the harm from unlawful disclosure would be realized.2 59
Taking the facts of TianRui, it is unclear whether there would have
been personal jurisdiction over the former DACC employees who disclosed
the trade secrets or over TianRui. Whether a court could exercise
jurisdiction over the former employees would probably depend on the
relevant provisions of their confidentiality agreements. Either way, choiceof-law questions remain. Finally, if the defendants were Chinese citizens,
there may be no personal jurisdiction in the United States.2 60 As for
TianRui, regarding the conduct of misappropriation in China-i.e., hiring
away employees and using trade secrets-there probably would be no
jurisdiction. 26 1 For the conduct of importing the goods into the United
States, however, it might have been possible to establish jurisdiction. One
would need to show the nexus between TianRui's acts of misappropriation
in China and sales of wheels in Illinois (or another forum state). A stream
of commerce theory may also be applicable, depending on whether sales
occurred in Illinois or elsewhere in the United States.262
Accordingly, the TianRui approach presents an easier, quicker, more
efficient option to trade secret owners dealing with an incident of foreign
misappropriation. As between the costs and uncertainty of obtaining
jurisdiction (discussed above) through the traditional route or feeling like it
is not worth pursuing the alleged infringement at all, the ITC may be an
attractive option. Indeed, it may become a new trend. In the five years prior
to the TianRui decision (1995-2010), there had been only two
investigations (including TianRui) at the ITC dealing with trade secret
misappropriation. 2 63 However, in the two-year period since the TianRui

257.
258.

See discussion supra Part IlIl.A.
See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (1lth Cir. 2005) (applying

Georgia law).

259.

See 3 Terrence F. MacLaren, Trade Secrets Throughout the World

§

40:79 (West 2013)

(recognizing that in some states, trade secret actions are grounded in contract); see also American

Nonwovens, Inc. v. Non Wovens Eng'g S.R.L., 648 So. 2d 565, 567 (Ala. 1994) (noting that in contract
actions, the law of the place of execution applies).

260.

See supra Part III.A. 1 discussing Formosa.

261.

See supra Part III.A. 1 discussing Formosa.

262.
See, e.g., Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
Trade
Commission,
U.S.
Int'l
337
Cases,
All
Section
263.
http://info.usitc.gov/ouii/public/337inv.nsflAll?OpenView (last visited January 11, 2014). Analytical
data on the cases is on file with the authors.
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decision (2011-2013), the ITC has seen an uptick in trade secret
misappropriation cases: five investigations were instituted. 264
D. Questions Remain
To be fair, TianRui and its implications raise legitimate questions that
ought not be ignored. Along with Judge Moore's dissenting opinion, others
have also criticized the ruling. 2 65 Admittedly, many valid questions
remain, not only about the interpretation of section 337 but also about the
implications going forward. One question is whether it is fair that an act
that would constitute misappropriation under most U.S. trade secret laws,
but does not constitute misappropriation in the country where the act
occurred, can be penalized with an exclusion order under section 337.
The TianRui opinion leaves as an open question what would happen if
there were a conflict with the foreign law. 2 66 However, under the tradebased argument presented in this Article, the issue does not necessarily
present a problem.2 67 That is because, as long as the conduct is illegal in the
United States, it is defensible to apply U.S. law to ban the goods from
entering U.S. soil. This limited remedy does not control conduct of the
foreign defendant in the foreign jurisdiction. The legal question section 337
presents is whether Congress made clear its intent to give the statute
extraterritorial reach, but Congress's power to do so as a matter of the
United States' sovereign authority to patrol its borders cannot be
questioned. Moreover, as a matter of policy, doing so would be an
important, positive step in addressing the increasingly pressing issue of
foreign IP infringement.

264.
265.

See id.
See, e.g., Viki Economides, Note, TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission:

The Dubious Status of Extraterritorialityand The Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61

Am. U. L. REv. 1235, 1251-52 (2012) (arguing that the court should not have applied the law
extraterritorially and that there was no domestic industry).

266.

TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1333 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The

court acknowledged that there was no conflict with Chinese trade secret law. Id. at 1333. China's basic
trade secret law is similar to that of the United States. See JAMES POOLEY, POOLEY ON TRADE SECRETS
§ 15.05[3] (2014).

267.

The presence or absence of a conflict of laws may bear, however, on discretionary issues of

comity and separation of powers. Where a conflict of laws exists, for example, there is greater

likelihood that barring importation could demean another nation's policies, laws, or judicial decisions.
Similarly, if barring importation could interfere with the Executive Branch's role in negotiating trade
and otherwise conducting diplomacy, separation-of-powers principles may militate against utilizing
section 337. A degree of flexibility for extreme cases is likely warranted and would not render section
337 as uncertain as the proceedings described above.
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There is also a larger and related theoretical question about what
exactly it means to "apply extraterritorially" a U.S. law.268 Does it mean
receiving punishment in the United States for what one did on foreign soil?
If so, then as in TianRui the penalty is limited because it encompasses only
a ban on importation. The severity of the importation ban will depend on
the value of the U.S. market to the defendant. Does it mean receiving
punishment in a foreign country for what one did on that foreign soil? Such
would be the situation in the cases granting worldwide injunctions and
prohibiting conduct, such as use or disclosure of a trade secret, on foreign
soil. Finally, does it mean getting punished anywhere for what one did on
foreign soil? Is it about the penalty at all? Based on these questions it is
unclear whether TianRui was an extraterritorial or quasi-extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, if at all. The court's import ban did not prevent the
defendants from selling to consumers outside the United States. Is it a
question of scope?
Perhaps the question is one of degree rather than being binary. There
are degrees of extraterritorial reach, and the extraterritoriality applied in
TianRui is comparatively limited because, while it does punish
extraterritorial conduct, it does so in direct proportion to the defendant's
interaction with the United States. This is something far different than
attempting to police conduct around the world in an effort to impose our
values on other sovereign nations. Moreover, it is increasingly rare that
U.S. trade secret law would conflict with that of the jurisdiction in which
the conduct took place. While this should have no bearing on a court's
interpretation of section 337, it does diminish the theoretical argument
against extraterritoriality generally. Section 337 would not impose U.S.
values to the exclusion of a foreign nation's; it would merely facilitate a
trade secret owner's enforcement of his rights as they are implicated in the
United States. This sort of facilitation is important because (a) a U.S.-based
trade secret owner would have difficulty enforcing its rights in a foreign
jurisdiction, and (b) if the primary harms arising from the misappropriation
occur in the United States, potential claimants in the foreign jurisdiction
may not be sufficiently motivated to prosecute possible claims.
On some level, it probably does not matter whether TianRui constituted
an extraterritorial application or not. The case was about the application
and interpretation of a specific administrative provision-section 337.
Thus, perhaps the more interesting question is the propriety of the in rem

268.
See Kenneth S. Gallant, What Exactly Is "Extraterritorial Application" of a Statute?, JuIusT
9:00 AM),
http://jurist.org/forumn/2013/05/kenneth-gallant-extraterritorial(May
28, 2013,
application.php.
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jurisdiction asserted in the case.269 While an in rem action, such as that
provided under section 337, is a way around establishing personal
jurisdiction in cases, constitutional concerns may arise in cases like these.
Accordingly, whether it is constitutional to exercise in rem jurisdiction both
in general and in cases like TianRui is worth exploring. Due process
concerns and the propriety of imposing harm on a foreign defendant's
property without personal jurisdiction raise interesting and thorny issues.2 70
Moreover, in that context, it may also be worth considering whether the
level of adversarial rigor at the ITC meets the standard or is sufficient to
justify the remedy imposed without having to establish personal
jurisdiction.2 71
E. Exploring Alternative Approaches
Other alternatives to this trade-focused ITC approach exist but none
seem significantly better. All have shortcomings. For instance, one could
consider a contributory infringement scheme, and courts have found
foreign manufacturers that sold infringing products that were later resold or
used in the United States liable as contributory infringers under § 271(c),
even though the manufacturer's acts took place entirely outside the United
States.272 This substantive remedy is supported by the liberal minimum
contacts test for establishing personal jurisdiction.273 While these fact
patterns appear similar to the scenario presented in TianRui, there is no
contributory infringement in trade secret law.274 Consequently, this is not a
feasible alternative for trade secret owners.

See Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The DigitalTrademarkRight: A Troubling New Extraterritorial
269.
Reach of United States Law, 81 N.C. L. REv. 483, 543-44 (2003) (exploring question in context of
trademark law and the ACPA).
270.
See id.
271.
The question would be whether in practice, the procedural and substantive rigor is similar to
those in other courts. However, the burden of proving trade secret misappropriation at the ITC appears
to be essentially the same as that in other courts. See Certain Processes for the Manufacture of Skinless
Sausage Casing and Resulting Products, Inv. No. 337-TA-148/169, USITC Pub. 1624, at 244 (Dec.
1984), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/337/publ624.pdf.
Chisum, supra note 251, at 615.
272.
273.
See Bradley, supranote 5, at 522-23; see also GB Mktg. USA Inc. v. Gerolsteiner Brunnen
GmbH & Co., 782 F. Supp. 763, 769 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
274.
Sharon K. Sandeen & Elizabeth A. Rowe, TRADE SECRET LAW IN A NUTSHELL, § 4.8.1
(2013).
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The Economic EspionageAct

Another possibility for trade secret owners might be the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA) 2 75 -the only existing federal law governing trade
secret theft. The EEA, a criminal statute, has expansive jurisdictional reach
to punish and deter the theft of domestic trade secrets and economic
espionage that occurs abroad.276 The EEA's long arm reaches U.S. citizens
and corporations for acts that occur abroad even if no other connection
exists to the United States. 277 If the defendants are not U.S. citizens or
permanent residents, the statute may still apply if an act in furtherance of
the offense occurred in the United States. 2 78 The statute thus requires some
U.S. connection, either via citizenship of the defendants or activity on U.S.
soil.
Despite this potentially broad reach, the Department of Justice has not
relied on this extraterritorial provision for any prosecutions to date.279
There are also practical limitations to prosecuting foreign citizens under the
Act. In one case, for instance, a Tokyo court rejected the U.S.
government's request to extradite a Japanese scientist to the United
States. 28 0 He was charged with misappropriation of genetic materials
relating to Alzheimer's research at the Cleveland Clinic Foundation.28 1
Given these kinds of limitations, the EEA has not proven a particularly
useful tool for trade secret owners, which further enhances section 337's
appeal.
2.

PossibleLegislative Alternative

A new statute resembling the ACPA or § 27(g) of the Patent Act might
be worth consideration as a means to address the extraterritoriality
problem. As discussed earlier,282 the ACPA provides, inter alia, for the
"owner of a mark" to file a civil action against the holder of a domain name
if the "domain name violates any right of the owner of a mark registered in
the Patent and Trademark Office."2 8 3 This provision is meaningless and

275.
Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (1996) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (2012)).
276.
18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2012).
277.
Id.
278.
Id.
279.

which
280.

A review of the cases prosecuted since the EEA's enactment does not reveal any cases in

§

1837 was utilized.
See Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation,22

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 484 (2006).
281.
Id.
282.
See supratext accompanying notes 103-05.
283.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).
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unenforceable, however, unless U.S. courts can obtain personal jurisdiction
over the alleged infringer (who often is located outside of the United
States).
The ACPA thus has additional language that provides for in rem
jurisdiction over the domain name itself when the trademark holder is
unable to locate or obtain in personam jurisdiction against the alleged
infringer.284 Therefore, "although a plaintiff may not be able to find, sue, or
even identify the alleged cybersquatter," she may "nonetheless bring an
action" in the judicial district in which the domain name is registered. 2 85 A
legislative model for trade secrets which provides for a similar kind of in
rem jurisdiction may be the way to tackle the problem. In the meantime, the
trade-based approach represented in TianRui offers a less drastic remedy
than the ACPA because it permits only an exclusion order. It does not
transfer the res to the trade secret owner, nor does section 337 provide
statutory damages like the ACPA.286
It is also possible that a statutory provision similar to patent law's
§ 271(g) could be enacted.287 Section 337 and its interpretation in TianRui
is already remarkably similar to § 271(g). Both allow for banning the
importation of infringing goods into the country. It is therefore conceivable
that legislation could be crafted that is consistent with the language of
TianRui's interpretation of section 337 in a framework similar to § 271(g).
An advantage to this federal legislative approach may be that the statute
could be used in courts of general jurisdiction and not be limited to the
ITC, as is currently the case. New legislation, however, is not likely the
best means to address the entire scope of the problems international trade
secret theft presents. Recent attempts at trade legislation have yielded only
partial and limited fixes 2 88 and potentially distract from more effective uses
of existing procedural and substantive tools.
284.

Id.

§ 1125(d)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

See John A. Greer, Note, If the Shoe Fits: Reconciling the International Shoe Minimum
285.
Contacts Test with the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1861, 1864

(2008).
286.
287.
288.

See l5U.S.C.l§ ll7(d)(2012).
See supra Part I11.B.2.
Consider, for example, the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, which amended

the EEA by expanding the scope of prohibited conduct and increase the maximum penalties. Pub. L.

No. 112-236, 126 Stat. 1627 (Dec. 28, 2012) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012)). The
amendment closes the loophole identified in United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012), by
redefining a trade secret to include processes used internally in connection to services used in
commerce. In addition, the Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012
increased penalties for violations of the EEA, but only the penalties in § 1831, which targets only trade
secret theft intended to benefit a foreign government, agent, or instrumentality. Pub. L. No. 112-269,

126 Stat. 2442 (Jan. 14, 2013).
These amendments, while potentially helpful in a handful of specific contexts, offer only a piecemeal
approach to addressing a problem that would be more effectively and comprehensively addressed by
increasing the usefulness of the laws that already exist. In this way, and by creating a perception that the
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VI. CONCLUSION

The trade-based approach to dealing with the extraterritoriality
challenge is both a useful and a necessary step toward providing a
victims of extraterritorial
remedy
for domestic
meaningful
misappropriation. The ITC, as an alternative forum for litigation, presents a
reasonable and meaningful alternative for U.S. trade secret owners who
wish to enforce their trade secret rights, but for whom traditional litigation
in state or federal courts is too burdensome and uncertain. While the
application of section 337 and its exclusion orders provide only a limited
remedy, it is nonetheless a step in the right direction for handling the global
nature of business today.

problem has been solved, relatively modest legislative modifications have the potential to do more harm
than good.
In any event, whether or not the White House's approach will be successful, its efforts demonstrate that
foreign infringement of U.S. trade secrets is a large-scale problem in need of a comprehensive solution.

